In August, the United States assembled an international
coalition to conduct a campaign of air strikes on ISIS positions in Iraq. Then,
in October, the coalition expanded the intervention into Syria. American
progressives have been relatively uniform in opposing the intervention against ISIS.
However, Hillary says,” a more effective coalition air campaign is necessary and we should be honest about the fact that to be
successful, airstrikes will have to be combined with ground forces actually
taking back more territory from ISIS.” Democracies favor remote strike weapons,
as launched aircraft, because they offer great destruction at the target
without necessary ground involvement. Personnel on the ground could be
captured, wounded, and killed by a simple technology that cannot harm aircraft.
And ironically, an Islamic State is more exposed than the
non-state actors from which ISIS was formed. ISIS is occupying and governing
territory, within a largely flat, not obscured natural environment, without significant
air or water transport, moving between cities, sometimes with captured military
trunks and its transporters, which are the easiest weapons to observe from the
air.
However, the air strategy has been chosen not for its
effectiveness in defeating ISIS, but for its effectiveness in reducing the
exposure of friendly personnel, while still offering spectacular images of
destruction. The trouble with an air campaign is that aircraft alone cannot
flush out ground forces. Jihadi insurgents normally travel in civilian
vehicles, which are effectively indistinguishable from collateral traffic,
unless ground intelligence has identified the particular vehicle in which a
particular target person is travelling at a particular time. If air campaigners
want to avoid these collateral risks, then they must focus on large assets in
barren areas, such as oil derricks in the desert. This is effectively the
current counter of ISIS strategy. But it is the least efficient and lease decisive
strategy. Because the ISIS is not dependent on heavy industry or urban
infrastructure. And it does not expose friendly personnel on the ground until a air force pilot is shot down in enemy territory. This was the terrible fate of the Jordan
whom ISIS captured in December and burnt to death. In response to his capture,
the United Arab Emirates had stopped air strikes pending some reassurance that
the coalition’s capacity for rescuing downed him could be improved. In
retaliation for this death, United Arab Emirates joined in. Egypt has stepped
up its strikes in Libya, in response to ISIS killing Egyptian nationals on the
ground there, and has accepted inevitable criticism of the high collateral
casualties. Retaliation is not a new or an effective military strategy – it just
offers domestic political advantages over doing nothing. The retaliatory
motivations of the latest air strikes, and the counter-productive collateral
harm, increase the net disadvantages. Therefore, I oppose the US direct air force military intervention against ISIS and in the Middle East.